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China as an Investment Power in Europe 
Olivia Gippner 
Discussions about Chinese investments in Europe in 
recent years have tended to stir public controversy and 
outright suspicions . As Chinese investments have risen 
strongly since the start of the financial crisis, some of 
the reactions by European politicians and media hint at 
a broader change in power relations between the two 
actors and an increasing threat perception in Europe. 
One of the reasons for this is the fact that Europeans 
see China competing at the same or a higher level. 
Good examples are large infrastructure projects, 
which, while very hard to implement in Europe, are 
quite common in China’s growing cities. This policy 
brief looks in more detail at what these investments 
tell us about Chinese FDI policy as well as how they are 
received in Europe. It examines in particular the energy 
sector, which has attracted increasing public attention, 
is linked to vital national interests and represents one 
of the main destinations for Chinese investors. The 
example of a Chinese state-owned company’s 
investment in the construction of the British nuclear 
point Hinkley Point C illustrates how business decisions 
are increasingly related to public perception and 
foreign policy in Europe. It concludes by highlighting 
how the EU could play an important role in creating 
predictable and legitimate rules for Chinese FDI 
through the conclusion of the EU-China Comprehensive 
Agreement on Investment.  
 
Converging policy challenges in Europe and China 
 
Chinese FDI in Europe has been increasing since 2011. In 
the energy sector, most of the funding has gone into 
technology investments into fossil fuel, renewable 
energy and utility assets. Chinese FDI has evolved in 
three phases (Jia 2015). From 2001-2008, that is pre-
crisis, China’s admission to the WTO and deregulation 
saw only a small portion of FDI going to Europe, while 
the large majority went to Asia. During the height of the 
financial crisis (2009-2012), there was a policy 
encouraging investment in Europe, which was met by 
European countries actually competing for Chinese FDI. 
Since 2012, a further strategic push on the Chinese 
government side as well as a more sophisticated 
strategy on the part of Chinese companies can be 
observed. The EU initiated the negotiations for an EU-
China investment agreement in order to achieve 
Executive Summary 
> Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
Europe has overtaken European FDI in China, 
in part due to the Chinese ‘Going out’ strategy. 
> In view of this trend, the broader public and 
foreign policy circles in big EU member states, 
such as Germany and the UK, fear a loss of their 
countries’ competitive advantage and 
technological know-how. 
> High-profile investment cases have led 
European countries to introduce safeguards 
for security-related investments and critical 
infrastructures. 
> Putting in place institutions such as the EU-
China Comprehensive Agreement on 
Investment and safeguards for Chinese-funded 
projects, but also enhancing their legitimacy 
with the European public will be crucial.  
> European policy-makers will have to increase 
their understanding of the variety of Chinese 
investors, be they state-owned enterprises or 
private companies, and at the same time avoid 
demonization of Chinese FDI.  
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reciprocal treatment in the Chinese market, for example 
concerning intellectual property rights. 
 
Since the crisis, Chinese companies have particularly 
been buying infrastructure assets for privatisation in 
countries such as Greece and Portugal. Other examples 
include French nuclear company Areva’s deepening ties 
with China. There are plans by the China National 
Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China General Nuclear 
Power Group (CGN), both state-owned companies, to 
obtain considerable shares in the French company. In 
line with that trend, CGN has also bought a 33.5 per cent 
stake in the British Hinkley Nuclear Power Plant project. 
 
There are several reasons for the increased FDI in energy 
from the Chinese perspective. First, China is in a process 
of reform of its economic system, which includes 
opening its capital markets and facilitating investments 
at home and abroad. The existing system of economic 
growth has been driven by investment in domestic 
infrastructure, creating overcapacities in some sectors 
and being increasingly difficult to sustain. Second, 
initiatives like ‘One Belt, One Road’ combine the new 
Chinese role as a global investor with energy security 
interests. The Chinese government is pushing towards a 
more competitive energy market domestically, 
especially in the area of renewable energy and to some 
extent nuclear power. It is also encouraging companies 
to invest abroad to open new markets and secure lines 
of energy supply. The Chinese solar industry is world-
leading, which is why including considerable 
environmental requirements among the criteria of the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is also aimed 
at creating demand in third countries. Finally, the United 
States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and other 
European countries are still popular targets of FDI, since 
favourable investment conditions, big markets, and 
reliable and transparent legal systems remain attractive. 
Chinese investment is especially directed to knowledge-
intensive economies (such as UK, Germany, France, 
Sweden) and large countries.  
 
As Chinese FDI has only become available in the past 
several years, the EU is working towards regulating 
investments through the EU-China Comprehensive 
Agreement on Investment, which is currently under 
negotiation. This agreement will have several clauses 
protecting standards, intellectual property, etc. There is 
no ban or embargo limiting Chinese investments in 
sensitive infrastructures in Europe. However, in the 
absence of a European regulatory framework, member 
states differ greatly in the restrictions they impose on 
Chinese investment. A common worry concerns the 
different roles of state-owned and private investors 
coming to Europe. It is a paradox that European publics 
are highly skeptical of state-backed FDI for reasons of 
protecting intellectual property and maintaining 
security, while Chinese experts rate the risk of 
‘predatory’ or ’careless’ investing much higher from 
private companies. 
 
To show how these dynamics play out in practice, the 
following section will look more closely at one of the 
evolving cases of Chinese FDI: CGN’s stake in the first 
new nuclear power plant in a generation in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
CGN’s share in UK’s Hinkley Point C nuclear power 
plant 
 
In 2006, the UK government decided that a future 
energy mix which would reduce carbon emissions 
needed to feature nuclear power. After choosing the site 
of Hinkley Point C for the construction of a new nuclear 
power plant and initial price negotiations in October 
2015, the main investor Eléctricité de France (EDF) from 
France got China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) 
on board to invest around 33.5 per cent in the £18 billion 
project. While there was already much debate about the 
viability of the new nuclear plant prior to the 
announcement of the Chinese investment, the Chinese 
involvement brought national security considerations to 
the fore. In a highly controversial move, newly 
appointed Prime Minister May delayed the 
government’s approval of the project in July 2016. A 
month later she gave her final go-ahead, however, only 
with a caveat of further government approval should the 
share of CGN in the investment  increase. 
 
Since October 2015, there are several key actors 
involved in the deal. Three governments, the UK, France 
and China; two companies (EDF Energy and CGN); as 
well as the EU as investment regulator. The EU 
institutions were involved earlier when approving the 
project as such as well as the British government’s 
guarantees for electricity prices, but the Union did not 
pronounce itself on the fact that a Chinese company was 
joining the investors. French government 
representatives welcomed the final approval, since the 
project as a whole is considered crucial for promoting 
French Evolutionized Pressure Reactor (EPR) 
technology. The focus remains firmly on the economic 
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progress of the nuclear industry and technology 
development, and May’s decision validated the French 
industrial strategy to invest into nuclear power.  
 
The British and the Chinese governments took key roles 
in the public debate. The British government considers 
the project important for several reasons. If safety 
concerns and the question of storage of nuclear waste 
are taken out of the equation, the project is promising 
on several accounts: it is predicted to create jobs 
(around 25,000 in construction and operation), 
demonstrate the feasibility of big infrastructure projects 
in Europe and the British government hopes to 
strengthen the UK’s leadership position on nuclear 
technology though its support. It would put the UK on a 
clear course toward achieving the Paris climate 
mitigation commitments. Hence, especially engineers 
are almost unanimously positive (Levey & Smith 2016). 
Worries about changing energy prices, significant cost 
increases for the British taxpayer and a delayed timeline 
for construction are part of the ongoing discussion 
about the project’s economic viability. However, inviting 
Chinese external investment rather than raising the 
missing 33 per cent domestically, is beneficial for 
balancing the UK’s big current account deficit (7.2 per 
cent of GDP in the last quarter of 2015) (Davies 2016). 
Finally, the investment was agreed during the visit by 
Chinese President Xi Jinping in London in October 2015. 
Its conclusion was hailed as part of the British-Chinese 
‘Golden Year’ and ‘Golden Age’. 
 
The Chinese government is pursuing several strategic 
objectives by facilitating CGN’s investment. One is 
about the UK-China relationship, which it is keen to 
develop, in particular economically. Second, exporting 
Chinese nuclear technology is part of the overall ‘Go 
Global’ strategy. While CGN would only financially 
invest in Hinkley Point C, part of the deal is also for CGN 
to later be allowed to construct a power plant with 
Chinese technology in another British site, Bradwell. It 
would mean exporting the Hualong One reactor type 
(referred to as HPR1000 on the European market) to 
Europe for the first time. The Bradwell plant signifies a 
shift in the bilateral relationship between the UK and 
China: as China was developing its own nuclear 
industry, it first used European and US technology and 
safety standards. Now it is not only using Chinese 
technology but even exporting it back to Europe, which 
shows that China is able to compete at the same level 
as Europe, if not reversing the relationship in specific 
technologies. 
Public reactions to China’s ‘Investment Power’ 
 
The British public was eyeing the continuous debates 
about the project and seems to feel increasingly 
pessimistic. In a poll by Populus in September 2015, only 
25 per cent of British citizens supported the project, 
while 44 per cent were opposed. 
 
The public debates on the Chinese investment display 
the underlying expectations and fears that come with a 
seemingly ‘objective’ business decision. Initially, Chinese 
investment in the project was carefully prepared under 
Prime Minister Cameron as one of the big successes 
during bilateral meetings in London in October 2015. 
Chancellor Osborne had visited Beijing a month before 
and secured the deal. In the same month, media 
narrative and pre-occupation with national security 
considerations started slowly coming to the fore. A 
major turning point was the change in government 
following the British EU referendum in June 2016. Once 
Cameron gone – Hinkley Point C having been one of his 
brainchildren – new Prime Minister May questioned the 
investment. While there was speculation on what 
elements her re-opening of the case would focus on, the 
approval in September 2016 demonstrated that it was 
the Chinese investment. Given the introduction of a new 
legal framework, May then gave the green light.  
 
This legal framework, which does apply to future Hinkley 
Point decisions, but would also include Bradwell, will 
provide the government with a veto right for foreign 
direct investments in critical infrastructures. This 
provision responds to British concerns, but it could also 
simply be symbolic of May’s more careful attitude when 
compared to her predecessor. Judging from the changes 
under the new agreement, the main concerns truly were 
about ownership and security since part-owner CGN is a 
Chinese state-owned company. May met Chinese 
President Xi Jinping also on the sidelines of the G20 
summit in early September, reaffirming their 
commitment to continue the Chinese-British ‘Golden 
Age’. With the new changes to the deal, May could 
appease concerns about Chinese partial ownership of 
Hinkley Point C and the prospect of a Chinese nuclear 
construction at the Bradwell site in the coming years. At 
the same time, an effort was made to be as diplomatic 
as possible by introducing a general national security 
test rather than focusing only on Chinese investment. 
 
Thus, initially an energy project between France and the 
UK, the Chinese investment has turned it into a matter 
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of foreign policy concerns in two regards: it has exposed 
the fear of possible interference in security 
infrastructure and shown the inability by the British side 
to refuse the Chinese investment at this point, due to 
broader strategic imperatives to reassure the bilateral 
relationship between the UK and China. As a journalist 
of The Telegraph criticised, ‘if the chief reason for 
continuing the project is to preserve good relations with 
France and China, the whole story is a textbook example 
of why it is hazardous to strike commercial deals with 
foreign state-owned companies’. 
 
The interpretation of the case and the development in 
China varies. For CGN the business angle is the most 
important one. Senior Vice-President of CGN, Zheng 
Dongshan, explains his company’s motivation for the 
project: ‘We have been working with EDF for three 
decades and we would like to bring the experience from 
China to the UK’. An observer also noted a core 
motivation to be the acquisition of technology. As a 
researcher from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
expressed in an interview, ‘In a way it is a pilot to show 
we can invest like that and it could possibly be a role 
model for other investments’. 
 
However, from a government perspective the political 
gain outweighs such uncertainties. This became 
particularly clear during the delayed approval by May. 
Emphasizing that this project has a geopolitical and 
diplomatic angle, the Chinese ambassador to the UK said 
it was about ‘mutual trust’ between the two countries 
and made his discontent with the repeated delay explicit 
in a Financial Times op-ed on August 8 (Liu 2016). In 
terms of the political aspects of the project, the Chinese 
mainstream view became mostly unified. Delaying or 
even cancelling the project was considered not only 
unwise but also extremely risky for the British 
government. Over the years, China has seen the UK as a 
doorstep to the European market, and invested 
tremendous amounts of money into the UK. But the 
recent Brexit movement and result coming from it adds 
uncertainties to that relationship. Therefore China will 
watch how May deals with this project very cautiously 
since it may give an indication as to whether the UK will 
still be playing this liaison role between China and 
Europe. 
 
 
 
 
A new type of FDI dynamics 
 
While the Hinkley Point C decision was particularly high 
profile and the final outcome has not yet been fully 
settled, the debate about Chinese FDI exposes new 
power dynamics between the EU and China, perceived 
as such in particular in the EU. It is representative of 
similar cases in Europe, such as State Grid’s bid for a 
stake in the Belgian gas and electricity network of 
distributors Eandis and the takeover of German robotics 
manufacturer KUKA by Chinese company Midea. Public 
debates in these cases are highly politicized and limit the 
room for manoeuvre for European companies and 
policy-makers. Looking at the example of the energy 
sector, two trends become evident: first, China and the 
EU increasingly pursue similar policy objectives in terms 
of developing energy technologies and securing global 
markets. This level playing field signals the two as 
competitors. European identity is furthermore put into 
question as Chinese investment behaviour is juxtaposed 
to a perceived weakness in implementing large-scale 
infrastructure projects in Europe after the financial 
crisis. Second, investment decisions – often initiated by 
businesses but allowed by governments – are perceived 
as assertions of power similar to that of trading or 
military strength, evoking feelings of fear.  
 
For the EU, this has several implications. The EU should 
work hard to conclude a bilateral investment treaty, 
replacing 27 such treaties between EU member states 
and China. By applying uniform rules and addressing 
valid concerns about Chinese investment conditions 
relating to security and social, economic and 
environmental safeguards, investments in Europe would 
become more predictable (Chinese companies also 
suffer when FDI cases get politicized) as well as 
legitimate. Ultimately, the building of knowledge on the 
different types of investors will also help to build 
European regulators’ capacity to appropriately deal with 
the Chinese investment European member states are 
actively trying to attract. This can also involve the need 
for European companies to make clear assessments on 
the investor’s identity before engaging in any deal. The 
development of long-term relationships between 
Chinese and European companies would best ensure 
such a good knowledge of the Chinese interlocutors. 
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